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A Model of Optimal Capital Structure
with Stochastic Interest Rates
Abstract
This paper develops a model of optimal capital structure with stochastic interest
rate which is assumed to follow a mean-reverting process. Closed-form solutions are
obtained for both the value of the firm and the value of its risky debt. The paper finds
that the current level and the long-run mean of the interest rate process play distinctive
roles in our integrated model. The current level of the interest rate is critical in the
pricing of risky bonds, while the long-run mean plays a key role in the determination of
a firm’s optimal capital structure such as the optimal coupon rate and leverage ratio.
Our findings demonstrate that a model of optimal capital structure with a constant
interest rate cannot price risky bonds and determine the optimal capital structure
simultaneously in a satisfactory manner. Furthermore, our numerical results indicate
that the correlation between the stochastic interest rate and the asset return of a firm
has little impact on the firm’s optimal capital structure.
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1 Introduction
The problem of optimal capital structure has long been an intriguing one among researchers.
Brennan and Schwartz (1978) are perhaps the first to study this problem using the contingent-
claims analysis approach of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). In an important
recent development, Leland (1994) introduces a model of optimal capital structure based
on a perpetuity. Leland and Toft (1996) extend the Leland model to examine the effect of
debt maturity on bond prices, credit spreads, and optimal leverage. Titman and Tsyplakov
(2002) develop a model of a firm that can dynamically adjust both its capital structure
and its investment choices. While very insightful, all these models assume that the risk-free
interest rate is constant, thus ignoring the impact of the stochastic nature of the interest
rate on the firm’s optimal capital structure. Empirical evidence has indicated that firms do
take into account the slope of the default-free term structure when they issue debt. See, for
example, Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and
Graham and Harvey (2001). In particular, there is evidence that firms prefer short maturity
debt when the term structure is steep. Graham and Harvey report that CFOs state that
the slope of the term structure is one important consideration when they decide on how to
refinance. These empirical evidences call for a model that includes both optimal leverage
and stochastic interest rate.
In this paper, we develop a model of optimal capital structure with stochastic interest
rate. More specifically, we combine the Leland-Toft optimal capital structure model with
the Longstaff-Schwartz (1995) bond valuation model under stochastic interest rate. One
advantage of our model is that it has closed-form solutions for both the firm value and
the debt value in the spirit of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). This allows us to perform
comparative statics. Modelling the interest rate as a mean-reverting process allows us to
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examine separately the impact of the long-run mean and the initial interest rate. Numerical
results from the implementation of our model indicate that the long-run mean of the interest
rate is an important determinant of the optimal capital structure. This is intuitive since
the long-run mean plays a key role in the determination of the tax shields and bankruptcy
costs resulting from the future debt issues. The initial interest rate level is important in
determining the price of current outstanding risky bonds, especially those with short and
moderate maturities. The reason is that it takes time for the interest rate to revert to its
mean level. Our results also indicate that the correlation between the interest rate and the
firm asset return has little impact. Furthermore, we find that the maturity of a bond is also
an important determinant in capital structure considerations.
An active and growing body of work has studied the valuation of risky corporate bonds
and other derivative instruments in a stochastic interest rate environment. Kim, Ramaswamy,
and Sundaresan (1993) calculate various corporate bonds in a series of numerical examples.
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) derive closed-form valuation expressions for fixed and float-
ing rate debt and find that the correlation between the underlying asset return and interest
rate has a significant effect on credit spreads.1 These models, however, assume that the
Modigliani-Miller theory holds, i.e., the value of a firm is independent of its capital struc-
ture. This implies that the firm does not derive tax benefits from issuing bonds.
The model proposed here combines two strands of the literature, namely, the valuation
models with stochastic interest rate in the absence of optimal capital structure, and the
optimal capital structure models in the absence of stochastic interest rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and derives various closed-form valuation expressions. Section 3 presents numerical results.
1Duffie and Singleton (1999), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), and many others specify the default outcomes
and value credit risk by no arbitrage.
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Some concluding remarks regarding possible extensions of the model are given in Section
4. The Appendix reviews the T -forward risk-neutral measure used to derive the valuation
expressions in Section 2.
2 The Model
In this section we first set up the valuation problem and then derive the formulas for the
firm value and the debt value.
2.1 The setup
Our assumptions and notations are mainly adopted from Leland and Toft (1996) and Longstaff
and Schwartz (1995). The main assumptions are summarized as follows.
Assumption 1 Financial markets are dynamically complete, and trading takes place con-
tinuously. Therefore, there exists an equivalent martingale measure (Harrion and Kreps,
1979) or a risk-neutral measure (Cox and Ross, 1976), Q, under which discounted price
processes are martingales.
Below we shall work directly under the risk-neutral measure Q (and the forward measure).
Assumption 2 The total value of the firm’s unlevered assets, Vt, is described by a geometric
Brownian motion process given by
dVt
Vt
= (rt − δ) dt+ σv dwQ1t, (1)
where rt is the interest rate at time t, δ is a constant payout rate, σv is a constant, and w
Q
1t
is a standard Wiener process defined on a complete probability space (Ω, P, F).
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Assumption 3 The interest rate rt follows the Vasicek (1977) model
drt = (α− β rt) dt+ σr dwQ2t, (2)
where α, β, and σr are constants, and w
Q
2t is another standard Wiener process on the same
probability space (Ω, P, F). The instantaneous correlation between dwQ1t and dwQ2t is given
by ρ dt.
Assumption 4 Assume that bankruptcy occurs when the value of the firm falls below a
constant level VB. If Vt > VB, the firm is solvent and pays the contractual coupon rate to its
debt holders. In the event of bankruptcy, bond holders will receive φVB with φ ∈ [0, 1) and
equity holders get nothing.
The exogenous flat default boundary assumed here follows from Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995) or Leland (1994). As mentioned in Black and Cox (1976), this type of boundary can
be considered to model some kind of net asset requirement in the bond covenants (protected
debt). This assumption is also made for analytical tractability. An endogenous default
boundary can be defined in our setting here. However, with stochastic interest rates, such a
boundary could only be obtained by using numerically intensive methods. The martingale
technique introduced later on won’t be applicable any more.
The sharing rule specified above is similar to the one assumed in Leland and Toft (1996)
and is referred to as the absolute priority rule. This assumption can be easily relaxed to
allow equity holders to share φVB with the bond holders.
Assumption 5 We consider a stationary debt structure where a firm continuously sells a
constant (principal) amount of new debt with a maturity of m years to replace the same
amount of principal of retiring debt. New bond principal and coupon are issued at rates
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p = P/m and c = C/m per year, where P and C are the total principal and total coupon
rates of all outstanding bonds, respectively.
This debt structure is the same as the one assumed in Leland and Toft (1996). The
advantage of this debt structure is its analytical tractability.
Essentially, we consider the Leland and Toft (1996) debt structure in the Longstaff and
Schwartz (1995) setting. Below we shall first derive formulas of risky bond prices and then
determine the optimal capital structure.
2.2 Default Probability under the T -forward Measure
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) derive various debt valuation expressions by solving a partial
differential equation (PDE). However, with rollover finite maturity debt, it is more convenient
to obtain the corresponding valuation expressions in closed form by the martingale approach.
To this end, we first derive the density distribution for the first passage time to be defined
below and then derive valuation expressions for finite maturity debt, using the T -forward
risk-neutral measure QT developed in the Appendix.
Given the interest rate process in Eq. (2), the price of a zero-coupon bond at time t with
a maturity of T years is given by (Vasicek (1977))
Λ(rt, T − t) = eA(T−t)−B(T−t) rt , (3)
where
A(T − t) =
(
σ2r
2β2
− α
β
)
(T − t) +
(
σ2r
β3
− α
β2
)
(e−β(T−t) − 1)−(
σ2r
4β3
)
(e−2β(T−t) − 1), (4)
B(T − t) = 1− e
−β (T−t)
β
. (5)
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Simple algebra now yields
σr Λr
Λ
= −σr B(T − t). (6)
It follows from the Appendix that under the T -forward risk-neural measure, QT , the two
processes, wQ
T
1t and w
QT
2t , defined by
dwQ
T
1t = dw
Q
1t + ρ σr B(T − t) dt, (7)
dwQ
T
2t = dw
Q
2t + σr B(T − t) dt, (8)
are two standard Wiener processes with correlation coefficient ρ. Under QT , the firm value
and the interest rate processes are given by
dVt
Vt
= (r − δ − ρ σv σr B(T − t)) dt+ σv dwQT1t , (9)
dr = (α− β r − σ2r B(T − t)) dt+ σr dwQ
T
2t . (10)
Define the first passage time τ as τ = min{t : Vt ≤ VB}, which is the first time that the
firm value Vt hits VB in some ω ∈ Ω under QT . Denote by F (T ) the cumulative distribution
function of τ under QT . Using a result in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), we arrive at an
expression for F (T ):2
F (T ) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
q(ti− 1
2
), (11)
where for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
ti = i
T
n
, (12)
q(ti− 1
2
) =
N(a(ti))−∑i−1j=1 q(tj− 1
2
)N(b(ti; tj− 1
2
))
N(b(ti; ti− 1
2
))
, (13)
2Note that we have modified the Longstaff and Schwartz’s original formulas. For details, see Huang and
Huang (2000) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).
7
a(ti) = −M(ti, T |X0, r0)√
S(ti|X0, r0)
, (14)
b(ti; tj) = −M(ti, T |Xtj)√
S(ti|Xtj)
, (15)
and where X ≡ V/VB, the sum on the RHS of (13) is defined to be zero when i = 1, and
M(t, T |X0, r0) ≡ EQT0 [lnXt] ; (16)
S(t|X0, r0) ≡ VarQT0 [lnXt] ; (17)
M(t, T |Xu) = M(t, T |X0, r0)−M(u, T |X0, r0) Cov
QT
0 [lnXt, lnXu]
S(u|X0, r0) (18)
S(t|Xu) = S(t|X0, r0)−
(
CovQ
T
0 [lnXt, lnXu]
)2
S(u|X0, r0) , (19)
with
EQ
T
0 [lnXt] = lnX0 +
(
−δ − σ
2
v
2
+
α− ρσvσr
β
− σ
2
r
β2
)
t
+
(
r0 − α
β
+
σ2r
β2
− σ
2
r
2β2
e−βT
)
B(0, t)
+
(
ρσvσr
β
+
σ2r
2β2
)
B(0, t)e−β(T−t) (20)
CovQ
T
0 [lnXt, lnXu] =
(
σ2v +
2ρσvσr
β
+
σ2r
β2
)
u−
(
ρσvσr
β
+
σ2r
β2
)
B(0, u)
−
(
ρσvσr
β
+
σ2r
2β
B(0, u)
)
B(0, u)eβ(u−t) (21)
VarQ
T
0 [lnXt] =
(
σ2v +
2ρσvσr
β
+
σ2r
β2
)
t−
(
2ρσvσr
β
+
σ2r
β2
)
B(0, t)
−σ
2
r
2β
B(0, t)2. (22)
2.3 Valuation Formulas in Closed Form
In this subsection, using the cumulative density function F (T ) obtained in the previous
subsection, we derive expressions for the bond price, the value of tax benefits, and the value
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of bankruptcy costs in closed form.
Consider a bond that pays a coupon rate c, has a principal value p, and matures at time
t. The payment rate g(s) to the debt holders at any time s is equal to
g(s) = c 1(s ≤ t) 1(s ≤ τ) + p δ(s− t) 1(s ≤ τ) + φ(t)VBδ(s− τ) 1(s ≤ t), (23)
where 1(·) denotes the indicator function and δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. Note that g(s)
is random because τ , by definition, is random. φ(t) is the fraction of the asset value, VB,
that the maturity-t bondholders receive in bankruptcy.
Under the risk-neutral measure, Q, the value of the debt at time zero is given by
d(V ;VB, t) =
∫ ∞
0
EQ[e−
∫ s
0
r(u)dug(s)]ds =
∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)EQ
s
[g(s)]ds. (24)
For simplicity, r0 has been suppressed in Λ = E
Q[e−
∫ s
0
r(u)du]. The term inside the square
brackets represents the discounted cash flow received during time interval ds. Taking expec-
tation under Q represents the present value of the cash flow, and integrating it gives rise to
the present value of the debt. The last step results from the s-forward risk-neutral measure
Qs,3 defined in the Appendix. Evaluating EQ
s
[g(s)], we have
EQ
s
[g(s)] = EQ
s
[c1(s ≤ t)1(s ≤ τ)] + EQs [p δ(s− t)1(s ≤ τ)] +
EQ
s
[φ(t)VBδ(s− τ)1(s ≤ t)] = c1(s ≤ t)(1− F (s)) +
p δ(s− t)(1− F (s)) + φ(t)VB1(s ≤ t)f(s). (25)
Note that F (s) = EQ
s
[1(s ≤ τ)] and f(s) = EQs [δ(s − τ)] = ∫∞0 f(τ)δ(s − τ)dτ are the
distribution function and density function of τ under the s-forward risk-neutral measure,
respectively.
3Note that we have used Qs to denote the forward risk-neutral measure because the appropriate time
here is s.
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We can now express d(V, VB, t) in closed form:
d(V ;VB, t) =
∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)c1(s ≤ t)(1− F (s))ds+
∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)p δ(s− t)(1− F (s))ds+∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)φ(t)VB1(s ≤ t)f(s)ds = c
∫ t
0
Λ(s)(1− F (s))ds+ Λ(t)p (1− F (t))
+φ(t)VB
∫ t
0
Λ(s)f(s)ds =
C
m
∫ t
0
Λ(s)(1− F (s))ds+ P
m
(Λ(t)(1− F (t))) +
φVB
m
(
Λ(t)F (t)−
∫ t
0
Λ′(s)F (s)ds
)
, (26)
where φ(t) = φ/m,4 c = C/m, and p = P/m have been substituted.
Assuming that the newly issued debt (at time 0) is priced at par, i.e., d(V ;VB,m) = P/m,
the coupon rate C can then be solved in terms of P by
C =
P (1− Λ(m)(1− F (m)))− φVB(Λ(m)F (m)− ∫m0 Λ′(s)F (s)ds)∫m
0 Λ(s)(1− F (s))ds
. (27)
Integrating d(V, VB, t) from 0 to m, we obtain the total value of all outstanding debts:
D(V ) =
C
m
∫ m
0
(∫ t
0
Λ(s)(1− F (s))ds
)
dt+
P
m
∫ m
0
Λ(st)(1− F (t))dt+
φVB
m
∫ m
0
Λ(t)F (t)dt− φVB
m
∫ m
0
(∫ t
0
Λ′(s)F (s)ds
)
dt, (28)
which can be simplified to
D(V ) =
C
m
∫ m
0
Λ(t)(1− F (t))(m− t)dt+ P
m
∫ m
0
Λ(t)(1− F (t))dt+
φVB
m
∫ m
0
(Λ(t)F (t)− Λ′(t)F (t)(m− t)) dt. (29)
The tax shield accumulation rate is given by θ C 1(s < τ), with θ being the corporate
tax rate. As in Brennan and Schwartz (1978) and Leland (1994), it is assumed here that the
firm loses its tax benefits forever after bankruptcy has occurred. Consequently, the value of
4This assumes that all the debts with remaining time to maturity within [0,m] have the same seniority.
φ is the total fraction of the assets that bondholders receive in bankruptcy.
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the tax shields is given by
TB(V ) =
∫ ∞
0
EQ[e−
∫ s
0
r(u)duθ C 1(s < τ)]ds = θC
∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)EQ
s
[1(s < τ)]ds
= θC
∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)(1− F (s))ds. (30)
Similarly, the rate of bankruptcy costs is given by (1 − φ)VBδ(s − τ), and the value of
bankruptcy costs is equal to
BC(V ) =
∫ ∞
0
EQ[e−
∫ s
0
r(u)du(1− φ)VBδ(s− τ)]ds = (1− φ)VB
∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)f(s)ds
= −(1− φ)VB
∫ ∞
0
Λ′(s)F (s)ds. (31)
Finally, the total firm value consists of three terms: the firms unlevered asset value, plus
the value of tax shields, less the value of bankruptcy costs:
v(V ) = V + TB(V )−BC(V ) = V + θC
∫ ∞
0
Λ(s)(1− F (s))ds+
(1− φ)VB
∫ ∞
0
Λ′(s)F (s)ds. (32)
The total principal P shall be determined by maximizing v(V ). Substituting C in terms of
P from (27) into the above expression for v(V ), we arrive at an unconstrained, univariate
maximization problem.
3 Numerical Results
In this section, we implement the optimal capital structure model developed in the previous
section. We consider first the benchmark case where the interest rate is assumed to be
constant. We then examine our proposed model with stochastic interest rate.
In the numerical calculations, the following base parameters are fixed: the asset return
volatility σv = 0.2; the corporate tax rate θ = 0.35; the bankruptcy cost parameter φ = 0.5;
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the asset payout ratio δ = 0.02; the interest rate process parameters are taken from Longstaff
and Schwartz (1995) and are given by σ2r = 0.001, α = 0.06, and β = 1.0. The base value
for the correlation coefficient between the interest rate and the asset return is assumed to
be zero.
3.1 Optimally levered firms with constant interest rates
Though a lot of work has been performed pricing defaultable bonds in a stochastic interest
rate environment, almost all work on optimal structure has assumed constant interest rate.
To see the impact of the interest rate variability on capital structure, we first consider the
benchmark case in which the interest rate is a constant.
Table 1 reports results with different interest levels (constant) and different bankruptcy
constraints. One observation from the table is that in a low interest rate environment, the
optimal coupon rate and leverage ratio are lower. One reason behind this is as follows. The
coupon payments contribute less to the total market value of a bond if the interest rate is
low, but only the coupon part is tax deductible. Therefore, with the same market value,
a bond in a low interest environment offers less tax shield. Another reason is that, in a
low interest rate environment, the risk-neutral drift of the asset return is lower, and thus,
the (risk-neutral) probability of bankruptcy is higher, and the expected bankruptcy cost
is higher. Consequently, it follows that a firm optimally levers less in a low interest rate
environment.
The result that a firm optimally levers less in a low interest rate environment may seem
odd at first glance. Intuition suggests that firms may find it more attractive to issue debt
in a low interest rate environment because the coupons they pay will be lower. However,
implicitly behind this reasoning is the assumption that interest rate will likely increase in
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the future. Ours is a comparative static result. It is assumed that the interest rate will be at
that level forever. Therefore, in a sense, it makes no sense to talk about high or low interest
rate. Each level represents a different state of the world.
Another observation from the table is that with less restrictive bankruptcy trigger level
(VB = 0.9P ), a firm optimally levers more. The reason is that with a lower bankruptcy level,
the probability and expected cost of bankruptcy are both lower. We can think of the level of
VB as the strength of the bond covenants to force bankruptcy. As the rights of debt holders
to force default increase (higher VB), firms find it optimal to use less leverage.
We can also see from the table that the coupon rate and credit spread of optimally levered
firms seem to be related to the maturity of the bonds in a non-uniform fashion. This is due
to the interplay of the tax shields, which favors long maturity debt, and the bankruptcy cost,
which favors short maturity debt. On the one hand, for the same market value of the bond,
the tax shield for short maturity debt is less than that of a longer maturity debt because the
coupon payments contribute less to the market value of the short maturity debts and only
the coupon part is tax deductible. Therefore, tax shield favors long maturity debt. On the
other hand, for the same coupon and principal, the expected bankruptcy cost is higher for
a longer maturity debt. Therefore, debt maturity is an important consideration in capital
structure considerations.
A somewhat surprising result is that at high interest rates, for given coupon and principal
of the bond, its yield curve is inverted. Initially the yield increases with maturity and then
declines. Since the interest rate is constant, the yield spread curve has the same property.
This implies that initially the market thinks the bond is risky but if the firm survives the first
few years, then its default probability will be considered to decrease. Another implication of
an inverted (risky) yield curve is that the yield of the total debt is higher than that of the
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newly issued debt, whose maturity is twice of the average maturity of the total debt.
3.2 Optimally levered firms with stochastic interest rate with base
values
We now examine the impact of stochastic interest rate. More specifically, we look at how the
characteristics of an optimally levered firm–such as the leverage ratio and credit spreads–
change when we vary a particular parameter in the interest rate process.
In Table 2, we consider the impact of the initial interest rate. As can be seen from the
table, the initial interest rate level is not as crucial as in the constant interest rate case. By
comparing with table 1, it is clear that a firm levers a lot more when the initial interest rate
is only 3%. In the stochastic case, the long-run mean of the interest rate is 6%. Therefore,
when a firm determines the debt amount initially, it considers not only the impact of the
current issue on the firm value but also the impact of all future issues on the firm value.
Therefore, the long-run mean is important. Since the interest rate in the real world is
stochastic, it is important to take into account the long-run mean of the interest rate process
in deciding the leverage ratio. For this reason, the characteristics of the optimally levered
firm with different initial interest rates are quite similar to the one with an initial interest
rate of 6%, which happens to be the long-run mean of the interest rate. Our results indicate
that when the current interest rate is different from the long-run mean, a stochastic interest
rate has a significant impact on the characteristics of the optimally levered firms. It is also
clear that bonds with longer maturities are even closer to their counterparts with an initial
interest rate 6% because the mean-reverting property of the interest rate has more time to
affect the initial bonds. The credit spread is lower for the total debt than the newly issued
ones. The reason is quite simple. The average maturity of the total debt is only half of the
maturity of the newly issued debt and generally shorter maturity debts have lower credit
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spread because the probability of bankruptcy is lower for shorter maturity debts. Notice
that, however, even though this result is intuitive, in the high constant rate case, the yield
curve may be inverted.
Note that even though in the stochastic interest rate case, the initial interest rate level
is less important than the constant interest rate case, this initial level of the stochastic
interest rate is still important in determining the price of a corporate bond. Note that if a
constant interest rate is to be used, the long-run mean appears to be the appropriate rate
to use. From table 2, we note that the characteristics of optimally levered firms change only
moderately when the initial interest rate changes from far below the long-run mean to far
above the long-run mean. However, using the long-run mean as the constant interest rate
level will grossly misprice the current outstanding debt. Suppose, for example, the initial
(current) interest is 3%. To price current outstanding debt, especially short-term ones, the
long-run mean, say 6%, is not appropriate. On the other hand, to price the future debts, or
more precisely, the tax shields and expected bankruptcy costs resulting from future debts,
the long-run mean is more appropriate than the current interest rate level, especially when
it is far from the long-run mean. Therefore, the assumption of a constant interest rate is
incapable of correctly pricing the current outstanding debt and determining the optimal
capital structure, especially when the current interest rate is different from the long-run
mean. In a stochastic interest rate model like ours, both the current outstanding debt and
future tax shields and expected bankruptcy costs are determined appropriately.
3.3 Optimally levered firms with stochastic interest rate with dif-
ferent correlation coefficients
Now we consider the effects of the correlation between the interest rate and the return of the
firm value on the characteristics of optimally levered firms. We keep the other parameters
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at their base values and the initial interest rate is the long-run mean 6%. We note that
for a given maturity, the characteristics of optimally levered firms with different correlation
between the interest rate and the return of the firms’ assets are similar. The reason is due to
the small impact of the correlation on the drift of the unlevered firm value dynamics under
the T -forward risk-neutral process. Note that in (9), under QT , the drift of Vt is changed by
ρσrσvB(T − t), which is less than 0.0063ρB(T − t) since we used σv = 0.2 and σr = 0.0316.
Because β = 1.0, B(T − t) is smaller than 1. Therefore, |ρσrσvB(T − t)| is less than 0.0063
and thus the correlation’s impact is small. However, we do note that the drift increases if the
correlation ρ is negative and decreases if ρ is positive. For this reason, the optimal coupon
and leverage ratio are higher for negative correlations.
3.4 Optimally levered firms with different correlations and initial
interest rates
In the previous subsection, we considered the impact of correlation with the same initial
interest rate. Here we consider the effects with different correlations and different initial
interest rates. Table 4 demonstrates clearly that the initial interest rate is more important
than the correlation between the interest rate and the return of the firm’s assets, especially for
bonds with shorter maturities. The reason is quite simple: for short maturity debts, there is
less time for the interest rate to revert to its long-run mean before the initial debts mature.
Again, with the same maturity and initial interest rate, firms with negative correlation
between the interest rate and the return of the firm’s asset optimally lever more because
negative correlation implies the risk-neutral bankruptcy probability is smaller.
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4 Concluding Remarks
Existing models of the optimal capital structure of a firm do not consider stochastic interest
rates. This paper considers stochastic interest rate, a firm’s capital structure, and the valu-
ation of the firm’s debt in a unified framework. Expressions for the total value of the firm
and for the firm’s risky debt are obtained in closed form.
When the interest rate is assumed to be a constant, the level of the interest rate has a
significant impact on both the optimal coupon and the leverage ratio. When the interest
rate is assumed to follow a mean-reverting stochastic process, however, the long-run mean
as well as the current level of the interest rate process are required to price the risky bond
and determine the optimal capital structure of the firm. On the one hand, the current
interest rate level is crucial in the pricing of the risky bond. On the other hand, the long-run
mean plays a key role in the determination of the tax shields and bankruptcy costs resulting
from the future debt. Therefore, a model of optimal capital structure with a constant
interest rate cannot simultaneously price risky corporate debts and determine the optimal
capital structure appropriately. A stochastic interest rate process is needed to account for
the evolution of the interest rate. While the long-run mean is shown to be important in
determining the optimal capital structure, numerical results indicate that the correlation
between the stochastic interest rate and the return of the firm’s assets has little impact.
Finally, besides the long-run mean, the maturity of the bond is also an important determinant
in capital structure considerations.
For tractability of the model, we have assumed that the default boundary VB is an
exogenously specified constant. Extending our model to allow for an endogenous default
boundary, in the sense of Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996), is an important but
challenging topic for future research.
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A The Forward Risk-Neutral Measure
In this appendix, we use the Girsanov theorem to derive the T -forward risk-neutral measure
in a multi-dimensional setting. Without loss of generality, we assume a probability space Q
generated by two standard Wiener processes
w˜Qt =
[
wQ1t
wQ2t
]
, (33)
with correlation matrix
ρ˜(t) =
[
1 ρ(t)
ρ(t) 1
]
. (34)
In the following, Q should be interpreted as the risk-neutral probability measure and rt the
riskless interest rate and is given by
drt = µ(r, t)dt+ σ(r, t)dw
Q
2t. (35)
We leave other random variables generated by wQ1t and w
Q
2t unspecified.
Suppose we want to compute the following expectation
h = EQ[e−
∫ T
0
r(u)duH({· · ·}, T )], (36)
where {· · ·} indicates that H({· · ·}, T ) may depend on the sample path in space Q from 0
to T . Let Λ(r0, T ) be the discount bond price at t = 0 with maturity T . Define
ξT =
e−
∫ T
0
r(u)du
Λ(r0, T )
. (37)
Then
h = Λ(r0, T )E
Q[ξTH({· · ·}, T )]. (38)
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It is clear that ξT is strictly positive and E
Q[ξT ] = 1. Therefore it can be used as a Radon-
Nikodym derivative to define a new probability measure QT equivalent to the original mea-
sure Q such that
EQ
T
[1{A}] = EQ[ξT1{A}] (39)
for any event A. Under the new measure QT ,
h = Λ(r0, T )E
QT [H({· · ·}, T )]. (40)
To find the Wiener processes under QT , define the likelihood ratio
ξt = E
Q
t [ξT ] =
e−
∫ t
0
r(s)dsΛ(rt, T − t)
Λ(r0, T )
. (41)
It follows that
log ξt = −
∫ t
0
r(s)ds+ log Λ(rt, T − t)− log Λ(r0, T ). (42)
Ito’s lemma implies
d log ξt = −rdt+ dΛ(rt, T − t)
Λ(rt, T − t) −
1
2
(
dΛ(rt, T − t)
Λ(rt, T − t)
)2
= (43)
[
−rΛ + Λt + u(r, t)Λr + 1
2
σ2(r, t)Λrr
]
dt/Λ +
σ(r, t)Λr
Λ
dwQ2 (t)−
1
2
(
σ(r)Λr
Λ
)2
dt. (44)
The term inside the square bracket is the fundamental PDE satisfied by the discount bond
price Λ, therefore
d log ξt = −1
2
(
σ(r, t)Λr
Λ
)2
dt+
σ(r, t)Λr
Λ
dwQ2 (t). (45)
Another application of Ito’s lemma yields
dξt = ξt
σ(r, t)Λr
Λ
dwQ2 (t) = ξtβ˜(t)
Tdw˜Qt , (46)
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where
β˜(t) =
[
0
σ(r,t)Λr
Λ
]
, dw˜Qt =
[
dwQ1t
dwQ2t
]
. (47)
Now the multi-dimensional Girsanov’s theorem implies that under the new probability
measure QT ,
w˜Q
T
t =
 wQT1t
wQ
T
2t
 = w˜Qt − ∫ t
0
ρ˜(s)β˜(s)ds (48)
are two standard Winner processes with correlation matrix ρ˜(t). In differential form,
dw˜Q
T
t = dw˜
Q
t − ρ˜(t)β˜(t)dt. (49)
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Table 1: Characteristics of Optimally Levered Firms with
Constant Interest Rate: σv = 0.2; θ = 0.35; φ = 0.5; δ = 2%
Maturity Coupon Principal Optimal Credit Spread Credit Spread Firm Value
m C P Leverage Total Debt Newly Issued v(V )
(Years) (Dollars) (Dollars) Ratio (Basis Points) (Basis Points) (Dollars)
Panel A: Constant Interest Rate r0 = 3% and VB = P
1.0 0.6176 20.5882 0.1987 0.0000 0.0000 103.6029
5.0 0.6283 20.8999 0.2017 0.6043 0.6451 103.6146
10.0 0.7877 24.7836 0.2397 16.1291 17.8134 103.8407
20.0 0.9580 27.4572 0.2665 43.4026 48.8942 104.3381
Panel B: Constant Interest Rate r0 = 6% and VB = P
1.0 2.4301 40.5001 0.3686 0.0186 0.0192 109.8807
5.0 3.3803 49.7279 0.4517 73.7005 79.7677 110.7958
10.0 3.2781 47.9478 0.4339 77.4542 83.6904 111.1916
20.0 3.0897 46.0659 0.4154 68.5268 70.7147 111.1333
Panel C: Constant Interest Rate r0 = 9% and VB = P
1.0 4.7490 52.6036 0.4601 2.6483 2.7821 114.3440
5.0 6.1185 59.8206 0.5186 115.8387 122.8091 115.8210
10.0 5.6558 57.1965 0.4948 88.2098 88.8410 115.6358
20.0 5.3945 55.7980 0.4818 72.7368 66.7967 115.3747
Panel D: Constant Interest Rate r0 = 3% and VB = 0.9P
1.0 0.7292 24.3056 0.2331 0.0000 0.0000 104.2535
5.0 0.7528 24.9875 0.2397 1.1949 1.2740 104.2789
10.0 1.1689 34.0796 0.3283 39.3084 42.9928 104.7507
20.0 1.3142 35.1986 0.3389 66.2648 73.3636 105.4574
Panel E: Constant Interest Rate r0 = 6% and VB = 0.9P
1.0 2.7731 46.2150 0.4153 0.0385 0.0398 111.2719
5.0 4.9811 63.7446 0.5692 171.2418 181.4226 112.9948
10.0 4.1046 57.0966 0.5074 112.1969 118.8833 113.2291
20.0 3.7298 53.9606 0.4778 90.2216 91.2042 113.0315
Panel F: Constant Interest Rate r0 = 9% and VB = 0.9P
1.0 5.4269 59.9717 0.5161 4.6805 4.9122 116.2305
5.0 7.6570 70.4273 0.5966 180.5942 187.2129 118.4640
10.0 6.7047 65.9760 0.5585 117.7985 116.2332 118.0199
20.0 6.2902 63.9390 0.5407 92.5907 83.7871 117.6183
23
Table 2: Characteristics of Optimally Levered Firms with
Stochastic Interest Rate with Base Parameters: σv = 0.2;
α = 0.06; β = 1.0; σ2r = 0.001; ρ = 0; θ = 0.35; φ = 0.5
Maturity Coupon Principal Optimal Credit Spread Credit Spread Firm Value
m C P Leverage Total Debt Newly Issued v(V )
(Years) (Dollars) (Dollars) Ratio (Basis Points) (Basis Points) (Dollars)
Panel A: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 3% and VB = P
1.0 1.7123 41.8706 0.3894 0.0002 0.0408 107.6783
5.0 3.6721 56.0164 0.5071 23.8926 124.5056 111.9693
10.0 3.3144 51.6853 0.4646 33.2413 83.2486 112.6234
20.0 3.1245 49.5142 0.4426 46.2934 59.8242 112.6577
Panel B: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and VB = P
1.0 2.7869 46.4925 0.4147 0.0030 0.2712 112.1220
5.0 4.3414 58.9209 0.5206 32.8860 140.1551 113.8083
10.0 3.7114 54.0841 0.4767 40.6638 90.2966 113.6959
20.0 3.4082 51.6394 0.4542 53.1024 64.4086 113.3671
Panel C: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 9% and VB = P
1.0 3.9664 50.1499 0.4291 0.0161 0.8782 116.7087
5.0 5.0483 61.7168 0.5322 43.4948 154.4233 115.7025
10.0 4.1414 56.5406 0.4888 49.3796 97.6445 114.8094
20.0 3.7148 53.8405 0.4660 60.5302 69.2923 114.1049
Panel D: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 3% and VB = 0.9P
1.0 1.9503 47.6877 0.4392 0.0005 0.0793 108.7401
5.0 5.7367 71.1636 0.6270 78.8985 276.1910 114.6721
10.0 4.1122 60.9477 0.5365 51.4572 116.9725 114.8322
20.0 3.7234 57.4568 0.5035 61.7316 76.9479 114.6856
Panel E: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and VB = 0.9P
1.0 3.1702 52.8664 0.4648 0.0056 0.4913 113.7572
5.0 6.5094 73.6921 0.6324 94.8493 286.6396 116.7986
10.0 4.5970 63.6789 0.5490 62.2818 125.9666 116.0744
20.0 4.0622 59.8997 0.5161 70.4812 82.5317 115.5039
Panel F: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 9% and VB = 0.9P
1.0 4.5135 57.0181 0.4788 0.0293 1.5408 118.9232
5.0 7.3212 76.2254 0.6376 112.3469 295.8597 118.9732
10.0 5.1205 66.4680 0.5612 74.7832 135.2299 117.3616
20.0 4.4276 62.4259 0.5288 79.9280 88.4518 116.3546
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Table 3: Characteristics of Optimally Levered Firms with
Stochastic Interest Rate with Different Correlation: σv = 0.2;
α = 0.06; β = 1.0; σ2r = 0.001; VB = P ; θ = 0.35; φ = 0.5
Maturity Coupon Principal Optimal Credit Spread Credit Spread Firm Value
m C P Leverage Total Debt Newly Issued v(V )
(Years) (Dollars) (Dollars) Ratio (Basis Points) (Basis Points) (Dollars)
Panel A: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and ρ = 0.75
1.0 2.5319 42.2514 0.3827 0.0007 0.0684 110.4136
5.0 3.9521 54.5552 0.4913 26.7767 127.8191 111.8328
10.0 3.5018 50.4945 0.4530 41.8276 97.5690 111.9598
20.0 3.2188 48.0706 0.4298 58.7829 74.0058 111.7186
Panel B: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and ρ = 0.5
1.0 2.6126 43.5969 0.3930 0.0011 0.1065 110.9471
5.0 4.0777 55.9849 0.5012 28.6001 131.7372 112.4497
10.0 3.5662 51.6129 0.4604 41.2936 95.0002 112.5059
20.0 3.2809 49.2213 0.4378 56.9776 70.9347 112.2375
Panel C: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and ρ = 0.25
1.0 2.6976 45.0081 0.4036 0.0018 0.1687 111.5156
5.0 4.2072 57.4403 0.5110 30.6236 135.8377 113.1073
10.0 3.6407 52.8540 0.4688 41.0847 92.8850 113.0847
20.0 3.3439 50.4103 0.4459 55.0852 67.7370 112.7865
Panel D: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and ρ = −0.25
1.0 2.8819 48.0635 0.4262 0.0051 0.4433 112.7693
5.0 4.4793 60.4234 0.5300 35.4245 144.7009 114.5553
10.0 3.7828 55.3481 0.4847 40.2062 87.5224 114.3417
20.0 3.4739 52.9116 0.4626 51.0320 60.9521 113.9804
Panel E: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and ρ = −0.5
1.0 2.9839 49.7385 0.4384 0.0090 0.7394 113.4608
5.0 4.6220 61.9459 0.5391 38.2941 149.5160 115.3508
10.0 3.8546 56.6459 0.4927 39.7094 84.5462 115.0230
20.0 3.5401 54.2194 0.4711 48.8333 57.3285 114.6290
Panel F: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 6% and ρ = −0.75
1.0 3.0953 51.5495 0.4514 0.0166 1.2698 114.2006
5.0 4.7695 63.4860 0.5479 41.5640 154.6523 116.1964
10.0 3.9265 57.9751 0.5007 39.1639 81.3396 115.7400
20.0 3.6074 55.5700 0.4797 46.5333 53.5681 115.3122
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Table 4: Characteristics of Optimally Levered Firms with
Stochastic Interest Rate with Different Correlation and Initial
Interest Rate: σv = 0.2; α = 0.06; β = 1.0; σ
2
r = 0.001; VB = P ;
θ = 0.35; φ = 0.5
Maturity Coupon Principal Optimal Credit Spread Credit Spread Firm Value
m C P Leverage Total Debt Newly Issued v(V )
(Years) (Dollars) (Dollars) Ratio (Basis Points) (Basis Points) (Dollars)
Panel A: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 3% and ρ = −0.75
1.0 1.9275 47.1071 0.4322 0.0018 0.2750 109.1616
5.0 4.0973 60.8780 0.5392 31.8391 142.0945 114.1619
10.0 3.5213 55.6016 0.4901 32.2114 75.2066 114.5599
20.0 3.3184 53.4298 0.4690 40.6354 49.7744 114.5377
Panel B: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 3% and ρ = 0.75
1.0 1.5281 37.3717 0.3515 0.0 0.0080 106.4706
5.0 3.2919 51.3580 0.4732 18.4873 109.7921 110.1700
10.0 3.1137 48.0764 0.4394 33.9977 89.6750 110.9819
20.0 2.9410 45.9640 0.4174 51.1678 68.6957 111.0676
Panel C: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 9% and ρ = 0.75
1.0 3.6391 46.0467 0.4015 0.0046 0.2763 114.5271
5.0 4.6539 57.5939 0.5069 36.8653 144.5609 113.5549
10.0 3.9238 52.9717 0.4664 51.0588 105.8202 112.9773
20.0 3.5201 50.2559 0.4424 67.1008 79.6749 112.3973
Panel D: Initial Interest Rate r0 = 9% and ρ = −0.75
1.0 4.3825 55.2303 0.4621 0.0751 3.4501 119.3566
5.0 5.4796 66.0473 0.5555 52.7467 165.9900 118.2829
10.0 4.3639 60.4041 0.5112 47.2834 87.7010 116.9617
20.0 3.9188 57.7829 0.4906 52.9556 57.5973 116.1156
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